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ABOUT THE STRUGGLE BETW EEN THE “LOW ER” AND “UPPER”
by Viktor Yelenskyy
Literally in the last few days I came across two recently defended dissertations about the
“laicization of Christianity” and “secularization of all sides of the social life of modern Ukraine.”
Interesting that at the same time the newly elected president calls for God’s help, the prime
minister consecrates his cabinet, the minister of culture drives out spirits from his, and in the
country every day an average of two new religious communities and almost 2.5 thousand churches
are created, the number of christenings in many oblasts equals to the number of newborns,
hierarchs publicly bless representatives of the government and announce their own political and
even geopolitical agendas… In Ukraine there is not one public figure who would decisively
proclaim himself an atheist, instead about their religious convictions politicians, sportsmen, and
show business stars try to outdo one another. W hat in the world incites researchers to speak about
the irreversible course of secularization?
It seems that above all this ineradicable confidence that once everything was different, that
our great-grandparents, not even to mention our ancestors, were not only more devout, but also
“genuinely” devout. It should be perceived as its own type the necessary alternate of the
circumstance that most communities in their evaluation of religiosity believe that the level of their
modern religious culture undergoes successive erosion, and that their devoutness declines and is
incomparable with that which was demonstrated by earlier generations. Almost every century we
see complaints about the decline of the society’s morals and nothing like the religious zealousness
of the “old days.” If to talk about our great-grandparents, then let’s turn our attention as an
example, one of many similar works, to the work of A. Schmidt “M aterials for Geography and
Statistics of Russia Compiled by Officers of General Staff. Kherson Province.” The author writes
that religious enthusiasm of Ukrainians of southern Ukraine in the second half of the 19 th century
died down when superstitions flourished: the Ukrainian believes in the existence of witches, house
spirits, the evil eye, is sufficiently certain in the efficacy of fortune telling.
Even more critical remarks we find in the records of bishops and eparchial missionaries.
They constantly complained about the peasants, who were forced to go to church on so-called
“tsarist days” and who don’t go to confession, and about the landowners, who through/due to
banquets, hunting, and merriment forget about the higher being.
The American religious sociologist Rodney Stark in his great piece “Secularization: RIP”
(1999) produces a large number of eloquent facts and research that attest: M edieval and Early
M odern Europe did not know a “Golden Age” of exemplary devoutness. Contemporaries
recognize both the absence of interest of regular people to attend church and the attempt of the
aristocracy to skip Sunday M ass, and weak knowledge by priests the basics of the faith (one of
many examples: in the year 1551 a bishop of the English Gloucester ascertained that of the 311
priests in his eparchy 171 could not name all Ten Commandments and 27 did not know the author
of the Lord’s Prayer).
Subjective perception – including the perception of m ass consciousness – can be very
deceptive. A well-known example: when the press gave confirmation about the constant, steady,
and rapid fall in the level of religiousness in the post-war French society, the research of
sociologists did not allow this to be talked about this so definitely. And on the contrary, in spite of
the fact that the majority of residents of all the post-Soviet countries feel that the number of
religious persons in their countries is steadily growing, religious practices here remain practically
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unchanged.
Now let’s recall that what the church was 200 or 300 years ago; it was an obligatory, not
an optional, so to say, institute. To enter this world, to start a family, and leave for a world better
outside the church was not possible: the church for the resident of the Ukrainian (and, of course,
not only Ukrainian) village was a registry office, club, theater, and mass media, and an official state
establishment. Let’s also recall that for the villager, who in the summer worked six days a week
without rest in the field, the hours during Sunday M ass were the only time to rest outside of sleep.
Therefore, above all, we have to critically react to the widespread thesis about today’s “laicization”
of religion. It fact, on the contrary: the church, at least in Europe, last century maybe for the first
time acquired the possibility to become just the Church and engage not in life on earth, but in
transcendentalism. It is necessary to consider not the fall of religious practice, but, for example, that
almost every fifth compatriot at least once a month attends church, which for me is rather
impressive.
Consider the modern citizen, who on Sunday is directed to the morning Liturgy, has
countless alternatives that his forefather sim ply did not. Not only the plurality of religious and
quasi-religious beliefs, but also the countless amusement possibilities that are available for the
person on Sunday morning and a bunch of errands which he didn’t finish during the week
competes with the traditional church. And notice the absence of rigid social control, which still 100
years ago dictated a person’s certain norms of behavior and kept him from acting disapprovingly.
And now let’s turn to something else. The post-Soviet societies that went through the
experiment of uprooting traditional institutional religiosity and where the participation of religious
institutes in the process of socialization for at least three generations was contracted to the
minimum, suggesting excessive requirements to the religiosity of their fellow citizens. Indeed, in
the scholarly study of religion the five dimensions of religiosity introduced by Charles Glock
practically became classical: religious faith, religious experience, religious knowledge, church and
ritual practice, and the dimension of ethical results of faith. Around these dimensions is a long
scholarly discussion, but maybe only in post-Soviet countries the school Glock is perceived not as
an instrument in the instrumentalization of religious manifestations, but as an adequate standard,
which has to correspond to the studied bearer of religiosity. In the mass consciousness is embedded
the image of a “true believer,” who consistently fulfills all the religious instructions,
unconditionally believes in the fundamental dogmatic principles of his church, regularly attends
divine service, has sound religious knowledge, and demonstrates a high moral behavior. The
inaccessibility of such an “ideal type” even in some approximation forms a conception about the
“inferiority” of the religiosity of Ukrainians. In reality, if we approach most monks and nuns with
such requirements then they could turn out to be “not true believers.”
In fact, the integrated index of religiosity of Ukrainians (religious behavior, religious
knowledge, individual devotion, religious-institutional attraction), put forth in the coordinates of
central and eastern European societies, attests about the “normality” of this religiosity. Ukraine lags
behind, certainly, Hungary and Slovakia, not to mention Romania and Poland, but leaves behind
Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia, and Belarus.
Further: with this empirical base, by which operates our modern sociology of religion, to
make a conclusion about whether the modernity of religion is being underm ined or not is not
possible; the concept about linear historic decline of religion is also not confirmed by research. A
known example is that the U.S. citizen in 1800 attended church less frequently than he does now.
Regarding the past we can talk also about a few waves of “religious returns”; one which began in
the last quarter of the 20th century and still today to a great extent determines the world’s religious
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development; this “return” includes a lift in the conservative wave in the world’s Protestantism,
fundamentalist waves like in the big (Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism) and in the national (Sikhism and
Judaism) religions, the M uslim Revolution in Iran, a national explosion directed against the ruling
regimes, Catholicism in South and Central America, Poland, the Philippines, and in South Africa;
the extensive spread of new religious movement in North America and Western Europe, and also
the recreation of religion into a significant factor for national and cultural mobilization in postSoviet countries, including Ukraine.
Nonlinearity of religious behavior is inherent and social, and for individual people. The
rigid distinction “believer – non-believer” cannot be considered correctly and suitably for scholarly
use. In certain vital situations the person turns to religion or, on the contrary, turns away from it.
By certain circumstances entire societies extract from religion a sense, a driving force for its
development, symbols, and demarcation markers. Such appeals we see in the English of the 1819th centuries, who separate themselves by their Puritanism from “French frivolity and perversion,”
or in the Irish whose national formation was accompanied by a “pious revolution.” On the other
hand, societies are able to refuse from religious causes even when religion composed the core of
the collective myth and was the main factor that for centuries differentiated a community from
others (like this was in the process of forming a modern Turkish nation, for example). The fall of
communism, which was accompanied by the erosion of old identities, called forth the appeal to
religion as a reliable system of values and national-cultural depository. At the same time, such
appeals are able to be changed (and really change) by periods of “religious cooling.”
A person, like once aphoristically indicated the surgeon M ykola Amosov, is not only who
he is to the belt, but also that which is lower. We are all, certainly, decayed creations, and we all
carry in ourselves the reflection of God’s likeness. That which is “lower,” fights with that which is
“higher” and this struggle will last, evidently, for all of human’s history.
(Source::
http://www.risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/authors_columns/vyelenskyi_column/35061)
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